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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
BOUNTIFUL WATER SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

Plaintiff and Respondent
Case No. 8426

vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, ET AL.,

Defendants and Appellants

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In the proceedings in the court below, the Respondent
here, Bountiful Water Subconservancy District, was plaintiff,
and the appellants here, Board of County Commissioners of
Davis County, et al., were defendants. We here refer to them
respectively as plaintiffs and defendants.
Defendants' outline in their Preliminary Statement of the
proceedings in the Court below is factually correct, except for
3
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one omission. That omission is that the lower court found as
a fact, and we do not understand that such findings is here
attacked by defendants, as follows:
"That in the year 1951 a committee of the House of
the Utah State Legislature considered the question of
the taxing powers to be given a sub-conservancy district,
prior to amending the legislation with respect thereto." ·
In view of the fact that it is by virtue of an amendment
to the Water Conservancy Act passed by the Legislature in
1951, that the power to levy an ad valorem tax was vested in
sub-districts, as contended by plaintiff, this finding is of significance.
Defendants have raised some five points of argument in
support of their position that the plaintiff subconservancy
district is without the power to levy the ad valorem tax in
question. We will follow the same points of argument, answering them seriatim.

POINTS OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT CONFERS THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION UPON WATER SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS.

POINT II.
THIS POWER TO TAX IS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED.

4
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POINT III.
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH,
1951, PROVIDING FOR THE POWERS OF SUBDISTRICTS SATISFIES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

POINT IV.
THE POWER TO LEVY AN AD VALOREM TAX
WILL NOT RESULT IN DOUBLE TAXATION.

POINT V.
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT
IS NOT SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE THE NECESSITY OF
AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT CONFERS THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION UPON WATER SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS.
It is without dispute that the Utah Water Conservancy
Act was originally patterned after the Colorado Water Conservancy Act (Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District,
et al., 106 Utah 55, 145 P. (2) 503), and that as originally
enacted the section .thereof dealing with the creation of subconservancy districts (100-11-14, U.C.A. 1943) conformed
5
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substantially to a similar section of the Colorado Act. We do
not contend that under this original provision subconservancy.
districts had the power of ad valorem property taxation. However, in 1951, the Utah Legislature by its adoption of Chapter
120, Laws of Utah, 1951, (now 73-9-14, U.C.A. 1953) substantially amended the original section, and with that amendment all similarity to the original section, and to the corresponding Colorado Section, disappeared.
Indication of this is the fact that prior to the 1951 amendment, directors of the subdistrict were the same individuals as
the directors of the parent district. However, in 1951 the Legislature provided that "a subdistrict shall be a separate entity
within the district", and that "the court shall appoint a board
of directors * * * who are not directors of the district."
Furthermore, it provided,
''The Board of Directors of a subdistrict shall have
the same powers and duties as a district board."
Thus it is apparent that with the 1951 amendment a subdistrict became a wholly separate and distinct entity, with a
board of directors vested with "the same powers and duties of
a district board."
Now, what are the powers of a district board with respect
to which under legislative fiat the powers of a subdistrict board
are as inclusive? Obviously they are all the powers conferred
by the Water Conservancy Act upon the board of the main
district. What are they?
Certainly they are not limited to those powers set out in
Section 73-9-1.), because the powers of the district board are
not so limited. For example, by Section 73-9-15, it is provided,
6
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"In addition to the other means of providing revenue
for such districts, as herein provided, the Board shall
have power and authority to levy taxes and special
assessments * * * as follows:
Class A. To levy and collect taxes upon all property
within the district as herein provided. * * * "
and by Section 73--9-16, it is provided:
"To levy and collect taxes under class A as herein
provided, the board shall, in each year, determine the
amount of money necessary to be raised by taxation,
taking into consideration other sources of revenue of
the district, and shall fix a rate of levy which when
levied upon every dollar of assessed valuation of property within the district, and with other revenues will
raise the amount required by the district, to supply
funds for paying expenses of organization, for surveys and plans, paying the cost of construction, operating and maintaining the works of the district; provided, however, that said rate shall not exceed one-half
mill on the dollar, prior to the commencement of construction of the works, and thereafter not to exceed
one mill on the dollar, of assessed valuation of the
property within the district; * * * ."
The matters covered in these two sections, 73-9-15 and
73-9-16, are specific powers granted to the board of a district,
not covered by 73-9-13, and creating the power of ad valorem
property taxation, and defendants do not contend that they are
without effect insofar as the district board are concerned. How,
then, can it be said that they are without effect with respect
to the subdistrict board, when the legislature has specifically
provided that the board of the subdistrict shall have the same
powers as the board of the district ?
Defendants' attempted answer to that question is ( 1) the
7
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legislature did not so intend it, and ( 2) the statute is ambiguous, and so should be construed against the power to tax.
As to ( 1), defendants say that if the subdistricts have the
power of ad valorem taxation equal to that of the districts, it
may result in what the defendants conceive to be excessively
high taxation.
Certainly in an arid state like Utah, where water acquisition, conservation and distribution is paramount, and where
water is looked upon as the life stream of the health, well
being and economy of the people, an additional property tax
of one mill, or even five mills in areas to be served by the
Colorado River Compact, if directed toward the acquisition,
conservation or distribution of needed water, is anything but
excessive. Be that as it may, defendants themselves provide the
answer to this contention by conceding that "it is within the
power of the legislature to levy such a tax."
And that the legislature intended to exercise this power
is evident by the language used, namely, that the subdistricts
should have the same powers as the district. Not the same
powers, less the power to levy an ad valorem tax, but the same
powers, which of necessity includes all of the powers of the
districts.
Section 68-3-2, U.C.A. 1953, sets forth the principle of
statutory construction in this state as follows:
"The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice ... "
8
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And Section 68-3-11, U.C.A. 1953, provides that:
"Words and phrases are to be construed according
to the context and the approved usage of the language . . . "
82 C.J.S. Section 396 (c), at pages 953-4, after setting
forth the general rule that the provisions of revenue laws
"are not to be extended by construction or implication beyond
the clear import of the language used," states:
"On the other hand, the rule of strict construction
should be applied with due regard to the intention of
the legislature as expressed in the statute, and not so
strictly as to defeat the legislative purpose, produce
an unreasonable result, or embarrass the taxing authority in its financial policies or the collection of taxes;
and the rule does not permit the court to disregard the
explicit language of the statute. The rule of strict
construction does not require that the words of the
statute be given the narrowest meaning of which they
are susceptible, but the words should be given their
full meaning. Moreover, it has been held that revenue
statutes should not be strictly construed, but should
receive a liberal, fair, or reasonable construction with
a view to carrying out their purposes and intent."
This general principle of statutory construction has received acceptance by this Court in Price vs. Tuttle, 70 Utah
156, 159, 258 P. 1016, where the court held:
"In the construction of statutes it is the duty of courts
to ascertain the intent of the legislative body and, if
the legislation is within the constitutional power of the
Legislature, to enforce that intent. In determining the
intent of legislation, not only the language of the act
may be considered, but the purposes or objects sought
by the Legislature should be and are considered by the
courts in determining the legislative intent."

9
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And in U. S. Smelting, Refining & Milling Co. vs. Utah
Power & Light Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P. 902, this court stated:
"As before pointed out, the act is intended to accomplish certain specific purposes, therefore all of its
provisions, so far as consistent with the rules of construction, must be construed and applied in harmony
with and in furtherance of those purposes. It is a wellrecognized rule of interpretation that where there is
doubt respecting the true meaning of certain words
then 'the words should be read in the light of the conditions and necessities which they are intended to meet
and the objects sought to be attained thereby.' " (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff submits that taxation is universally regarded as
a "power" in the usual meaning of the term, and that the
conditions and necessities intended to be met and the objects
sought to be attained by granting to subdistricts the same
powers and duties as a district board, are, among others, those
enumerated in Section 73-9-16, U.C.A. 1953, supra.
Finally, defendants argue under this point that the statute
is ambiguous, and so should be construed against the subdistrict's right to tax, and cite numerous authorities in support
of the proposition that tax statutes of doubtful meaning should
be construed against the taxing authority. We do not dispute
the general rule so stated, nor the cited authorities, but do
suggest that it may not be of universal application, as we will
develop under the following point of argument. We do, however, challenge the premise that we have here a tax statute
of doubtful meaning. Certainly, there is nothing doubtful or
ambiguous on its face. It says subdistricts shall have the same
10
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power as districts, and words Jreer from doubt or ambiguity
could not have been chosen.
However, to the end of reading ambiguity into this provision, defendants argue that inconsistencies otherwise develop
in connection with Class C assessments, and particularly because Section 73-9-18, dealing with sales of water by the district to irrigation districts and in connection with which either
the district or the irrigation district may levy the special
assessments as determined by the conservancy district, further
provides that if subdistricts are created, special assessments
shall be made and collected as in the case of irrigation districts.
We find no inconsistency here. This section, which certainly is far removed from the one involved in this case, simply
provides that the subdistrict, like irrigation districts, may
petition the district for water. If it does so, and the petition
is granted, the cost of the water shall be defrayed by special
assessments against the lands within the subdistrict. The
district itself may make the levy, or it may, at its option, enter
into a contract with the subdistrict under which the subdistrict
may make the levy. The conclusion drawn by defendants tliat
this procedure constitutes the subdistrict a subordinate to the
district as a matter of law, is unjustified, because the procedure
involved, if the assessments are to ~e levied by the subdistrict,
is by virtue of contract between the district and subdistrict.
The next to the last sentence of the Section ( 7 3-9-18) establishes this. It provides:

"If the board determines that such assessments shall
be levied by the irrigation (sub) district, the district
shall make a contract with the irrigation (sub) district
11
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which shall provide among other things for the annual
payment to the district of an amount to be obtained
from the levy by the irrigation (sub) district of annual
assessments in accordance with the irrigation district
law." (Interpellations ours).
Some difficulty of practical operation under such a contract
between the district and subdistrict is not inconceivable, but
that will be the problem of the parties thereto, if and when it
arises. It has, we submit, no bearing upon the present problem.
That it was the intention of the legislature to grant to
subconservancy districts the power to levy an ad valorem tax
on property within its boundaries, is further indicated by Section 7}-9-1, U.C.A. 1953, which states in part:
"It is declared that to provide for the conservation
and development of the water and land resources of
the state of Utah, and for the greatest beneficial use
of water within this state, the organization of water
conservancy districts, and the construction of works as
herein defined by such districts, are a public use and
will:

" (a) be essentially for the public benefit and advantage of the people of the state of Utah
" (c) indirectly benefit the state of Utah in the increase of its taxable property valuation
'' (e) directly benefit lands to be irrigated or drained
from works to be constructed
" (f) directly benefit lands now under irrigation by
stabilizing the flow of water in streams and by increasing flow and return of flow of water to such streams
" (g) promote the comfort, safety and welfare of
the people of the state of Utah, and it is therefore
declared to be the policy of the state of Utah:
12
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" ( 1) To control, make use of and apply to beneficial
use all unappropriated waters in this state to a direct
and supplemental use of such waters for domestic,
manufacturing, irrigation, power and other beneficial
uses.
'' ( 4) to promote the greater prosperity and general
welfare of the people of the state of Utah, by encouraging tbe organization of water conservancy districts as provided in this act." (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy
District, supra, while declaring a water conservancy district
to be a "public agency," and "quasi-municipal corporation,"
this court held that:
"It is the public purposes for which a water conservancy district is organized that distinguishes it from
drainage or irrigation districts. The public purposes
for which a water conservancy district is organized
inures to the benefit of the public generally, and therefore, the public can be charged for such benefits through
general taxation." (Emphasis added.)
Because of the nature of a subconservancy district, and
the fact that it may be organized for all purposes for which
a conservancy district is created, this language must, of necessity, apply equally to subdistricts. The contention of defendants
that "the subconservancy district makes sense only as a special
improvement district" is therefore without merit and contrary
to the holding of this court.
Adherence to this fundamental principle of law is not
to be found in the argument of defendants, and the clear
and forceful statement of the legislature that subdistricts have
the same powers as districts may not be nullified by gratuitously
appending an exception thereto.

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THIS POWER TO TAX IS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED.
While it cannot be gainsaid that the general rule is that
the power to tax must be expressly provided, it is equally well
settled that the rule finds considerable relaxation in its application to public corporations of a municipal or quasi municipal
character. As stated in 38 Am. fur. (Mun. Corp.) Section 385:
"In spite of the well-settled and uncontroverted rule
that a municipal corporation has no inherent right to
levy taxes, and to justify the exercise of the power of
taxation must show its warrant from the legislature,
it has frequently been held that there is no requirement
that the delegation of authority be express, and that
the investing of a territorial subdivision with the
character of a municipal corporation necessarily carries
with it the power to levy taxes for all the purposes with
respect to which it is authorized to act. The number
and variety of works which may be authorized, having
a general regard to the welfare of the city or of its
people, are mere matters of legislative discretion but
all of them require for their execution considerable
expenditures of money, and their authorization without providing the means for such expenditures would
be an idle and futile proceeding. Their authorization,
therefore, implies and carries with it the power to
adopt the ordinary means employed by such bodies
to raise funds for their execution, unless such funds are
otherwise provided. And the ordinary means in such
cases is taxation. A municipality without the power of
taxation would be a body without life, incapable of
acting, and serving no useful purpose. For the same
reasons, when authority to borrow money or incur an
obligation in order to execute a public work is conferred
upon a municipal corporation, the power to levy a
tax for its payment or the discharge of the obligation

14
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accompanies it; and this, too, without any special mention that such power is granted."
To the same effect is the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. New Orleans}
98 U. S. 381, 25 L. Ed. 225.
''The position that the power of taxation belongs
exclusively to the legislative branch of the government,
no one will controvert. Under our system it is lodged
nowhere else. But it is a power that may be delegated
by the Legislature to municipal corporations, which
are merely instrumentalities of the State for the better
administration of the government in matters of local
concern. When such a corporation is created, the power
of taxation is vested in it as an essential attribute, for
all the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be
in express terms prohibited."
Defendants recognize this exception to the general rule,
but deny its applicability here, contending that a subdistrict
is not a public corporation of a municipal or quasi municipal
nature.
In this connection it cannot be contended that a water
conservancy district is not a quasi municipal corporation, as
the same have been held such by this court in the case of
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District} supra. As
pointed out by defendants in their brief, "a state agency is
quasi municipal in nature only if it serves a public purpose
or benefit." Lehi City v. MeilingJ 87 Utah 237, 48 P. (2) 530.
We submit a subdistrict under the water conservancy act serves
the public purpose and benefit equally with the parent district.
The legislature in its enactment of the Water Conservancy
Act recognized that the public purposes and objectives thereby
1)
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sought to be served might be attained by the creation of water
conservancy district and subdistricts in providing for the creation of subdistricts the legislature of necessity contemplated
that the same would contribute to the accomplishment of the
public objectives. Subdistricts were, by the 1951 amendment,
vested with the same power as districts. This was no idle gesture
on the part of the legislature, for subdistricts were provided for
under the original act, albeit with limited powers. Ten years
later the legislature recognized that the public purposes might
better be served by broadening the powers of the subdistricts,
and so, by the 1951 amendment, subdistricts were vested with
the same powers as the district.
To say, as defendants do that subdistricts exist only for
the benefit of "local interests" is to ignore the fact that subdistricts are provided for under the law, and exist to the end
of accomplishing the public purposes of the Water Conservancy Act, and for no other purpose. That this purpose is
served on a somewhat more restricted basis than that of districts does not detract from the fact that each is in its way
serving the public purpose prescribed by the Act.
Thus a subdistrict, being a quasi municipal corporation,
finds itself within the purview of the exception enunciated
by the foregoing authorities, with the power of taxation a
necessary attribute to its existence and subject only to express
limitations thereon in the Act itself.
Aside from that, however, is the fact that we have here
an express grant of power to tax. By Section 73-9-13, districts
are given the power to do many things to accomplish the public
purpose of the act. By Section 73-9-15 and 73-9-16 districts

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are in addition to the matters covered in 73-9-13, given the
power of ad valorem taxation. By Section 73-9-14 subdistricts
are given the same powers as districts, and if this provision
is to be given effect it means that subdistricts are granted the
express power to tax. What defendants are seeking to do is
to read an exception into the grant of powers given the subdistricts which the legislature did not see fit to express.

POINT III.
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH,
1951, PROVIDING FOR THE POWERS OF SUBDISTRICTS SATISFIES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
The defendants contend that the title of Chapter 120,
Laws of Utah, 1951, does not satisfy the requirement of
Article VI, Section 23, of the Constitution of Utah, which
provides:
"Except general appropnatwn bills, and bills for
the codification and general revision of laws, no bill
shall be passed containing more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
The title in question is as follows:
"An Act Amending Section 100-11-14, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 95, Laws of
Utah 1949, Relating to Water Conservancy Districts
and the Organization of Subdistricts, and providing the
Method for Organizing such Subdistricts, for the Appointment of the Board of Directors and the Powers
and Duties of Such Board."
17
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The defendants argue that the title "does not adequately
apprise nor reasonably call to the attention of the legislators
or the public the object of the legislation if the power to levy
an ad valorem property tax is contained in the body of the act."
In making this argument it is apparent that the defendants
have ignored holdings of this Court in which the purpose and
meaning of the constitutional provision are fully discussed.
In the early case of In re Monk, 16 Utah 100, 50 P. 810,
the Court made the following statement as to the purpose and
meaning of the constitutional provision:
"This provision limits each bill to one subject, and
requires that subject ta be clearly expressed in its title.
It requires the purpose of the bill to be clearly stated,
but does not require the mention of the observances to
effectuate the purpose. The subject must be expressed
in the act, but an analysis of the subject need not be.
The law may contain numerous sections, and each
section may contain one or more provisions, provided
they are limited to requisites constituting the mode
or way of effecting the expressed purpose. Many details may be covered by one subject. The end to be
effectuated by the law may be expressed in general
terms. The purpose so expressed constitutes the subject,
and the method to be provided and the means to be
employed in accomplishing the purpose are embraced
in the subject, and need not be specially pointed out."
In the case of Martineaux z·. Crabbe, 46 Utah 327,
150 P. 301, the Court said:

~36,

"Manifestly the purpose of this provision of the
Constitution is to prevent the Legislature from intermingling in one act two or more separate and distinct
propositions-things which, in a legal sense, have no
connection with, or proper relation to, each other. The
18
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reasons for, and the scope of, constitutional provisions of this character, are well illustrated in 26 A. & E.
Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 575, in the following language:
"This requirement of singleness is not intended to
embarrass honest legislation, but only to prevent the
vicious practice of joining in one act incongruous and
unrelated matters; and if all the parts of a statute have
a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly
or indirectly to one general and legitimate subject of
legislation, the act is not open to the objection of
plurality, no matter how extensively or minutely it
deals with the details looking to the accomplishment
of the main legislative purpose."
See also the case of State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153
P. 2d 647, 655, in which this court reviews the law on the
subject.
''The decisions of this court announce the rule that
the legislature may not include matters which are
neither related nor germane to one subject; but that the
constitutional provision is not to be applied so as to
hamper the law-making power in adopting comprehensive measures covering a whole subject, where
matters included all have some direct connection with
or relation to the principal subject treated; and that
constitutional provision should be so applied as to
guard against the real evil whcih it was intended to
prevent. Utah State Fair Ass'n. v. Green, 68 Utah 251,
249 P. 1016; Elder v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 P. 367,
Martineau v. Crabbe, 46 Utah 327, 150 P. 301. See
Crawford Statutory Construction, Sec. 98, and Cooley's
Constitutional Limitation, 6th Ed., pp. 170, 171."
For a very excellent discussion of the purpose and meaning
of the constitutional provision see Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, Eighth Edition at pp. 292-302. The discussion of
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the particularity required in stating the subject on pages 296
and 297 is precisely in point.
"The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has but one general object which
is fairly indicated by its title. To require every end
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a
separate act relating to that alone would not only be
unreasonable, but would actually render legislation
impossible. It has accordingly been held that the title
of "An Act to establish a police government for the
City of Detroit," was not objectionable for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with the
establishment and efficiency of such a government
including taxation for its support1 and courts for the
examination and trial of offenders might constitutionally be included in the bill under this general
title." (Emphasis added.)
A title need not disclose the means and instrumentalities
provided in the body of the act for accomplishing its purpose.
Provisions reasonably necessary for attaining the object of
the act expressed in the title are considered included in
the title. See Cooley 299. In Pioneer Irrigation District
v. Bradbury1 8 Idaho 310, 68 P. 295, the title of an act
attacked under the Idaho counterpart of Section 23 of Article
VI was "To amend Sections 2, 11, 22 and 26 of an Act Entitled an Act to Provide for the Acquisition of Water and
other Property and for the Distribution of Water thereby for
Irrigation Purposes." The Supreme Court of Idaho held that
provisions for the levying and collection of assessments were
covered by the title. It was also held in a leading Illinois case
that "An Act to incorporate the Fireman's Benevolent Asso20
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ciation" may unlawfully include under this title provisions
for levying a tax upon the income of foreign insurance companies at the place of its location for the benefit of the corporation. Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511.
"There has been a general disposition to construe
the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to
embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purpose for which it has been adopted." (Cooley

P. 304.)
Upon analysis of the title to Chapter 120 in the light of
the rule adopted by this Court and followed in the cases cited
above, it is clear that it meets the requirements of the constitutional provision. The one subject clearly expressed in the
title is the organization of subdistricts. The provisions in the
chapter as to the method of organization, the appointment of
the board of directors and the powers and duties of the board
including the power to levy taxes and assessments are so obviously "related and germane to the subject" within the meaning of the rule that further argument would unduly labor the
point.
There is no requirement that the title be an index to the
bill. It is absurd to suggest that the title must mention all of
the powers granted to the district board in the long and complicated conservancy act. And yet this would have to be done
if the defendants are right in their argument that the title is
not adequate. If the title was faulty because it did not specifically mention the power to tax it was also faulty because
it did not mention the power to levy assessments, the power
to enter into contracts and the twenty or thirty other powers
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mentioned specifically in the conservancy district act. The argument of the defendants that the inclusion of the power to tax
is an "enlargement upon the subject matter" is directly contrary to the universally accepted rule that provisions "related
and germane" to the general subject may be properly included
without specific mention in the title.

POINT IV.
THE POWER TO LEVY AN AD VALOREM TAX
WILL NOT RESULT IN DOUBLE TAXATION.
It is not here contended by the defendants that subdistricts, when created, are not lawful entities under the statute,
vested with the powers and charged with the responsibilities
fixed by the legislature, and wholly separate and distinct from
the parent districts. In fact Section 73-9-14 is specific upon the
point that ''a subdistrict shall be a separate entity within the
district."

It is stated on page 28 of the defendants' brief that
"double taxation exists if both taxes have been imposed in
the same year, for the same purpose, by the same taxing
authority and upon property owned by the same person." There
is no "double taxation" here because the tax would be levied
by different taxing authorities (the district and the subdistrict)
and for different purposes.
It is clear from an examination of the Act that one of
the prime objectives of districts and of subdistricts is the
conservation and distribution of water through the construction
and operation of works and facilities.
22
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It is contemplated that the district and subdistrict will
construct separate distribution systems. The district will construct water treatment plants and the main trunk lines to the
various parts of the district, and the subdistrict will construct,
operate, and maintain a pressure distribution system to take
water from the district facilities to the homes, farms and
other places of use. Also, the subdistrict may well conserve
and utilize water from the canyon streams and other sources.
Once the water is available and distribution facilities
have been constructed, it is reasonable to assume that costs
of the water, amortization of the facilities, and operation and
maintenance overhead will be defrayed through revenues derived from sales of water. Those systems, however, do not
just grow, but must be engineered and constructed prior to
the time sales of water are effected. During this formative
period subdistricts created for the purpose of providing distribution facilities must have funds with which to defray
preliminary engineering and feasibility studies. That a subdistrict has the power under the law to borrow is no solution,
because, except as the subdistrict has the means to repay, the
power to borrow is but a naked right. Nor may funds necessary
for these preliminary studies be raised by B, C or D assessments for the reason that the right to levy such assessments
are conditioned upon the availability of water, which postdates the incurring of these preliminary expenses.
Accordingly, the legislature provided for ad valorem property taxation, and in Section 73-9-16 authorized a levy of not
to exceed one-half mill prior to commencement of construction, and one mill thereafter, for the purpose, among others,
23
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of "paying expenses of organization, for surveys and plans,
paying the cost of construction, operating and maintaining
the works of the district."
The requirement of these funds is no less present with
a subdistrict than with the parent district. The subdistrict is
burdened with the expense of organizing, surveys and plans
the same as the main district, and without the preliminary
one-half or one mill levy is, at that stage, wholly without
funds. The subdistrict also has the expense of constructing,
operating and maintaining its separate works. The fact that
both the district and subdistrict may make the levy does not
constitute the levy by the subdistrict unlawful upon the ground
of double taxation.

POINT V.
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT
IS NOT SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE THE NECESSITY OF
AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION.
Thts point of argument has to some extent been developed under plaintiff's preceding point, wherein it was
poinred out that necessity exists for funds derived through
the ad valorem tax for the purpose of defraying preliminary
costs and expenses of organization of the subdistrict, surveys,
engineering and feasibility studies, all at a time prior to that
upon which other sources of revenue become available.
Nor do we concede that as a general rule improvement
districts may not levy a general property tax, as this depends
solely upon what the Legislature provides in regard thereto.
2·i
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We have in mind, for example improvement districts for
water, sewer and sewage systems created pursuant to Chapter
6, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953, which are vested by the legislature
with the power to levy a general property tax up to four mills.
Accordingly, it is reaSO!J.able to assume that the legislature
intended to do what it did, namely, vest this subdistrict with
the power to levy a general property tax of not to exceed onehalf mill at the present time and of not to exceed one mill
after construction of the works has commenced.
Reference to the Colorado Act on the subject is of no
present aid. Originally, as heretofore pointed out, under both
the Colorado and Utah acts, subdistricts had no power to levy
ad valorem tax. Colorado solved the problem in its way by
specifically excepting the Colorado Water Conservancy District and the Southwestern Water Conservancy District from
this limitation and granted them the power to so tax. Utah
solved it in its way by granting subdistricts generally the same
power as districts, thus vesting subdistricts with the power to
levy a limited general property tax. The fact that Utah did
it in its way, instead of Colorado's way, is no indication that the
Utah legislature intended to do less than it did.
The fact that Colorado has loosened the restriction m
the case of the two districts above referred to is further evidence, however, that in Colorado, as in Utah, subdistricts
may and do require the benefit of general taxing powers in
order to discharge their public duties and meet their public
responsibilities, a fact that Utah has likewise recognized in
giving subdistricts the same powers as districts.
Likewise the fact that a subdistrict acquires the water to
25
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be used by it from the district, is of no particular significance,
because having a supply of water available is but a part of the
problem that confronts the subdistrict. It still has the problems
and costs of organization, engineering, surveys and feasibility
studies which it itself must assume and pay for, and with
respect to which the general levy is a necessity.

CONCLUSION
We submit, accordingly, that under the law as it now
exists, the plaintiff subdistrict has the right and power to
make the general one-half mill levy upon the property within
its boundaries, and the judgment of the lower court must be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

KEITH L. STAHLE
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD
E. J. SKEEN

Attorneys for Respondent
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